

Discussion on Sohn (2018)

Hyeok Yong Kwon

Korea University

2018 Asian PolMeth, Seoul

Contributions of the paper

- Methodological
 - Provides a statistical method to estimate ideal point from non-voting datasets
 - Based on game-theoretic framework of coalition formation
 - Refinement of the existing measurement models
- Substantive
 - Shows contours and evolutionary paths of the legislature in South Korea
 - Provides rich datasets and ample research opportunities, not only for Korean politics scholars but also comparativists

Questions & comments

- Revealed preferences recovered by analyzing bill cosponsorship?
 - Cheap talk / Time-inconsistency problem?: Cosponsoring a bill is one thing, voting in the floor is another (especially when legislators' voting record is unknown to the public under authoritarian regime).
 - Principal-agent problem?: Staffs usually prepare a bill and collect cosponsors via her network of staffs (sometimes under the ignorance of the legislator).

Questions & comments

- On **issue-specific** preferences
 - **What to make evidence of?** – would be nice to have conceptual/theoretical lens
 - **Valence issue vs. Position issue** (Stokes)
 - Legislators' preferences / behavior may differ by the type of issues
 - On valence issues, we expect less heterogeneity
 - E.g., A bill on supporting and promoting K-pop worldwide

Questions & comments

- Methodologically,
 - Is the proposed method *complementary* or *an alternative* to the existing measurement models (mostly based on roll call voting)?
 - How much and to what extent does the proposed method perform better than the existing models?

Questions & comments

- Deriving substantive research questions?
 - Political regimes and party polarization
 - Legislator coalition behavior under competitive authoritarianism (1963-1971), authoritarian (1972-1987) vs. democratic regime (1988-present)
 - Electoral systems and party polarization
 - Income inequality and party polarization (McCarty et al. 2006)